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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _____________ 
 
POLLAK, District Judge. 
 
 This case is about the negligent failure of an attorney 
representing a deportable alien -- a woman who has lived in the 
United States for twenty-five years and has a husband and two 
children who are American citizens -- to file with the 
immigration judge in timely fashion an application for 
discretionary relief that, if found meritorious, would have saved 
his client from deportation.  Because of the attorney's lapse, 
the immigration judge (1) ruled that the intended application for 
discretionary relief had been abandoned, and (2) ordered the 
alien deported.  On appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Board), the alien's attorney sought to persuade the Board that 
his client should not suffer disadvantage because of his 
negligence; but the Board upheld the decision of the immigration 
judge.  On petition for review of the decision of the Board the 
attorney for the alien repeats and elaborates his plea of mea 
culpa.  The attorney contends that the crucial ruling of the 
immigration judge which the Board sustained -- the ruling that 
the attorney's failure to file the intended application for 
discretionary relief in timely fashion constituted an abandonment 
  
of the application -- worked a denial of due process to his 
client, since the immigration judge had not warned the attorney 
of the potential adverse consequences of a failure to file on 
time.  The attorney also challenges the ruling of the immigration 
judge, sustained by the Board, as an abuse of discretion.  We 
find no error in the decision of the Board and we therefore deny 
the petition for review. 
 I. 
 In January of 1993 respondent Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) served on petitioner Bibi Fazallah 
Green -- a citizen of Guyana who came to the United States as a 
student in 1969 and became a permanent resident in 1983 -- an 
order to show cause why she should not be deported.  According to 
the INS order to show cause, Green had twice been convicted of 
possession of a controlled substance:  both convictions were in a 
Pennsylvania state court, the first was in 1990, the second in 
1992.  The INS alleged that these convictions made Ms. Green 
subject to deportation under two distinct provisions of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 ("the Act").  Section 
241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act provides that, "upon the order of the 
Attorney General," "[a]ny alien who at any time after entry has 
been convicted of a violation of . . . any law or regulation of a 
State . . . relating to a controlled substance . . . other than a 
single offense involving possession for one's own use of 30 grams 
  
or less of marijuana . . . is deportable."1  And section 
241(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act provides that, "upon the order of 
the Attorney General," "[a]ny alien who is convicted of an 
aggravated felony at any time after entry is deportable."2 
                     
1
.  Section 241(a)(2)(B)(i), codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1251(a)(2)(B)(i), provides in full as follows: 
 
    (a) Classes of deportable aliens 
 
    Any alien (including an alien crewman) in the United 
States shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be 
deported if the alien is within one or more of the 
following classes of deportable aliens: 
 
 * * * * * * 
 
   (2) Criminal offenses  
 * * * * * * 
 
     (B) Controlled substances 
 
  (i) Conviction    
    
    Any alien who at any time after entry has 
been convicted of a violation of (or a 
conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or 
regulation of a State, the United States, or 
a foreign country relating to a controlled 
substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 
21), other than a single offense involving 
possession for one's own use of 30 grams or 
less of marijuana, is deportable. 
2
.  Section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii), codified at 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii), includes among the category of "criminal 
offenses" rendering an alien deportable: 
 
  Aggravated felony 
 
    Any alien who is convicted of an 
aggravated felony at any time after 
entry is deportable. 
 
  
 Ms. Green retained Robert S. Whitehill, a Pittsburgh 
attorney, to represent her before the INS.  In a telephone status 
conference conducted by Immigration Judge Fujimoto on August 18, 
1993, Mr. Whitehill disputed Ms. Green's deportability under the 
aggravated felony provision (section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii)) but 
conceded deportability under the possession-of-a-controlled-
substance provision (section 241(a)(2)(B)(i)).  At the same time, 
Mr. Whitehill advised Judge Fujimoto and INS District Counsel 
Richard Sharkey that Ms. Green would seek to avoid deportation by 
applying for a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 
(..continued) 
    Section 101(a)(43), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), 
provides: 
 
   The term, "aggravated felony" means murder, 
any illicit trafficking in any controlled 
substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 
21), including any drug trafficking crime as 
defined in section 924(c)(2) of Title 18, or 
any illicit trafficking in any firearms or 
destructive devices as defined in section 921 
of such title, any offense described in 
section 1956 of Title 18 (relating to 
laundering of monetary instruments), or any 
crime of violence (as defined in section 16 
of Title 18, not including a purely political 
offense) for which the term of imprisonment 
imposed (regardless of any suspension of such 
imprisonment) is at least 5 years, or any 
attempt or conspiracy to commit any such act.  
Such term applies to offenses described in 
the previous sentence whether in violation of 
Federal or State law and also applies to 
offenses described in the previous sentence 
in violation of foreign law for which the 
term of imprisonment was completed within the 
previous 15 years. 
  
212(c) of the Act.3  The INS, for its part, reasserted the 
contention that Ms. Green was subject to deportation under the 
                     
3
.  Section 212(c), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c), provides: 
 
  Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence who temporarily proceeded abroad 
voluntarily and not under an order of 
deportation, and who are returning to a 
lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven 
consecutive years, may be admitted in the 
discretion of the Attorney General without 
regard to the provisions of subsection (a) 
(other than paragraphs (d) and (9)(C)).  
Nothing contained in this subsection shall 
limit the authority of the Attorney General 
to exercise the discretion vested in him 
under section 211(b).  The first sentence of 
this subsection shall not apply to an alien 
who has been convicted of one or more 
aggravated felonies and has served for such 
felony or felonies a term of imprisonment of 
at least 5 years. 
 
    In Lozada v. I.N.S., 857 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1988), the 
petitioner was, like Ms. Green, a permanent resident alien whom 
the INS viewed as deportable and who hoped to avoid deportation 
via a section 212(c) application.  The First Circuit explained, 
in a footnote, id. at 11 n.1, the pertinence of what would appear 
to be quite inapposite statutory language: 
 
   Petitioner would seem ineligible for relief 
under the language of section 212(c), which 
applies on its face only to resident aliens 
who have travelled abroad temporarily and are 
excludable upon return to the United States.  
However, in Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d 
Cir. 1976), the court ruled that Congress 
could not constitutionally confine this 
possible relief to aliens who leave the 
country.  After Francis, the Board of 
Immigration Appeals held that section 212(c) 
relief also is available in deportation 
proceedings.  Matter of Silva, 16 I & N Dec. 
26, 30 (BIA 1976). 
  
aggravated felony provision as well as the possession-of-a-
controlled-substance provision.   
 At the close of the conference, Judge Fujimoto set 
deadlines for future proceedings.  With respect to the aggravated 
felony issue, Judge Fujimoto postponed findings pending 
submission by Mr. Sharkey of documents establishing with 
precision the state charges pursuant to which Ms. Green was 
convicted; an October 1, 1993 deadline was set for the filing of 
these materials.  Judge Fujimoto then addressed Mr. Whitehill 
(A.R. 107-08): 
 
 JUDGE TO MR. WHITEHILL 
 
  Q.  You've already conceded deportability on the 
one charge, Mr. Whitehill, so as relief you're 
going to be requesting 212(c) waiver.  Correct? 
 
  A.  Sure are. 
 
  Q.  All right.  October 1st is the call-up date 
for that as well.  And, then we'll hold a hearing, 
assuming the application has been filed, on 
November 4th, 1993, 9:00 a.m., in Pittsburgh.  
And, we'll send you a written notice of that 
hearing date. 
 
 JUDGE TO BOTH COUNSEL 
 
  Q.  Is that acceptable, then, to both sides? 
 
 JUDGE TO MR. SHARKEY 
 
  Q. [sic]  Yes, sir. 
 
 JUDGE TO MR. WHITEHILL  
 
  A.  To the alien, it is acceptable. 
 
  
  Q.  All right.  Let me again run through it very 
briefly.  I've -- you've conceded deportability on 
the controlled substance.  Prior to rendering a 
finding on the aggravated felony charge, I'm 
asking the Service to submit the indictment and 
the state statute under which the respondent was 
convicted.  Mr. Whitehill, you'll be submitting 
your 212(c) application on or before October 1st.  
If you wanted to make an argument with regards to 
why she is not deportable as an aggravated felon, 
please also have that argument tendered on or 
before that date.  We'll then go forward with 
individual calendar hearing November 4th, 9:00 




 As of October 1, 1993, the date specified by Judge 
Fujimoto on August 18, Mr. Whitehill had filed neither a § 212(c) 
"call-up" application nor a motion to extend the time to file.  
Twenty-seven days later there had still been no filing by Mr. 
Whitehill.  On that day -- October 28, 1993 -- Judge Fujimoto 
filed the following decision (A.R. 89-90): 
  DECISION OF THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE 
   The respondent is a female native and 
citizen of Guyana [*] who was admitted to the 
United States on August 22, 1969 as a  
 nonimmigrant student.  On February 24, 1983, 
her status was adjusted to that of a lawful 
permanent resident.  Deportation proceedings 
were commenced against her through the 
issuance of an Order to Show Cause, charging 
her with deportability under the above-
captioned sections of the Immigration & 
Nationality Act. 
 
   At her hearing, the respondent, through 
counsel, admitted allegations 1 and 3 through 
7 contained in the Order to Show Cause and 
conceded deportability under Section 
241(a)(2)(B)(i), relating to having been 
  
convicted of a controlled substance 
violation. [**] 
 
   The respondent requested leave to file an 
application for a waiver of inadmissibility 
under Section 212(c) of the Act and was given 
a call-up date of October 1, 1993, for the 
filing of the application. 
 
   To date, no application has been filed, nor 
has any request for an extension of time been 
received.  It is well settled that 
applications for benefits under the 
Immigration & Nationality Act may be properly 
denied as abandoned where the alien fails to 
timely file them.  See Matter of Jean, 17 I & 
N Dec. 100 (BIA 1979); Matter of Jaliawala, 
14 I & N Dec. 664 (BIA 1974); Matter of 
Pearson, 13 I & N Dec. 152 (BIA 1969); Matter 
of Nafi, 19 I & N Dec. 430 (BIA 1987). 
 
   Accordingly, the following orders will be 
entered: 
 
 ORDER:  The respondent's request to apply for 
a waiver of inadmissibility under Section 
212(c) of the Act is DENIED for lack of 
prosecution. 
 
 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent be 
deported from the United States to Guyana 
under Section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act. 
 
 
 DATE: October 28, 1993 James R. Fujimoto 
      Immigration Judge 
      
 _______________ 
 
 [*]  The respondent asserted that she is a native and 
citizen of "British Guiana (British Guyana)".  I take 
note of the fact that "Guyana" and "British Guiana 
(British Guyana)" refer to the same country [see 
Webster's II New Riverside Dictionary] and therefore 
find that allegation 2 has been sustained. 
  
 [**]  In view of respondent's concession of 
deportability under Section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) and 
  
pretermission of her application, I do not reach the 




 The next day -- October 29, 1993 -- Mr. Whitehill sent 
Judge Fujimoto a motion to reopen.  The motion stated, in 
pertinent part (A.R. 53-54): 
  8.  On August 18, 1993, the Court 
ordered counsel to file for 212(c) relief on 
or before October 1, 1993. 
 
  9.  Solely through inadvertence of 
counsel, the request for relief was not 
timely filed. 
 
     10.  On October 28, 1993, at 
approximately 10:00 a.m. the Office of the 
Court advised undersigned counsel 
telephonically that an Order was being issued 
by the Court, Fujimoto, J., to deport the 
alien, without a hearing, preserving rights 
of appeal, for failure to prosecute the 
relief sought under 212(c). 
 
    11.  Counsel has prepared this motion and 
the attached I-191 which was not able to be 
receipted on October 28, 1993, but will be 
filed October 29, 1993.  The fee receipt will 
be forwarded to the Court. 
 
    12.  It is respectfully submitted that the 
Court's order, if properly understood by 
undersigned counsel, denies the alien's right 
to due process of law. 
 
    13.  An order of deportation without right 
of trial creates a human tragedy which may be 
able to be avoided. 
 
    14.  By virtue of the Court's order and 
without a hearing to assert her grounds for 
relief, the alien, her children and her 
husband, all U.S. citizens, may be forced to 
suffer the consequences of the alien's 
  
deportation based solely on counsel's failure 
to timely file the formal pleading, an I-191.   
 
 The motion to reopen was not formally acted on.  On 
November 4, 1993, Mr. Whitehill sent Judge Fujimoto a notice of 
appeal to the Board with a copy to INS District Counsel Sharkey. 
 On March 24, 1994, the Board issued an opinion 
affirming Judge Fujimoto's decision.  The central holding of the 
Board was as follows (A.R. 3-4): 
 On appeal, the respondent contends that the 
late filing of her application was due to the 
inadvertence of her counsel.  She asserts 
that the immigration judge's deportation 
order is an error of law in that it deprived 
her of her due process rights to have her 
application for relief considered and an 
abuse of discretion since the late filing is 
excusable. 
 
 * * * * * * 
 
 [A]n alien seeking reopening of deportation 
proceedings in order to file an application 
for relief from deportation must show 
reasonable cause for her failure to timely 
file the application.  See 8 C.F.R. § 3.29 
(if an application is not filed within the 
time set by the immigration judge, the 
opportunity to file that application shall be 
deemed waived); Matter of R-R-, Interim 
Decision 3182 (BIA 1992). 
 
   The respondent has not shown reasonable 
cause for failing to timely file an 
application.  See Matter of R-R-, supra.  
Generally, litigants are bound by the conduct 
of their representatives.  See Garcia v. INS, 
___ F.3d ___ (No. 91-2113) (1st Cir. October 
22, 1993); Magallanes-Damian v. INS, 783 F.2d 
931 (9th Cir. 1986); Matter of Velasquez, 19 
I&N Dec. 377 (BIA 1986).  Deadlines set for 
the filing of applications for relief often 
are breached by attorneys and would be 
  
meaningless if counsel's mistakes in this 
regard were excused every time such action 
allegedly prejudiced a client.  Garcia v. 
INS, supra. 
 
   We therefore conclude that because the 
respondent has failed to show reasonable 
cause for failing to timely file the Form I-
191 application, the case will not be 
remanded to the immigration judge. 
 
   ORDER:  The decision of the immigration 




 The petition for review focuses on the Board's reliance 
on 8 C.F.R. § 3.29 (hereinafter "§ 3.29"), an INS procedural 
regulation which provides as follows: 
    The Immigration Judge may set and extend 
time limits for the filing of applications 
and related documents and responses thereto, 
if any.  If an application or document is not 
filed within the time set by the Immigration 
Judge, the opportunity to file that 
application or document shall be deemed 
waived.4 
 
 The petition for review does not quarrel with the 
propriety of vesting in immigration judges, by administrative 
regulation, the authority to "set . . . time limits for the 
filing of applications."  Rather, the petition for review takes 
exception to the fact that Judge Fujimoto did not expressly 
advise Mr. Whitehill that failure to file a § 212(c) application 
                     
4
.  As of 1993, § 3.29 had been renumbered as § 3.31(c), 8 C.F.R. 
§ 3.31(c).  But since the Board, in its opinion, referred to the 
regulation as § 3.29, we will follow that usage in this opinion. 
  
on Ms. Green's behalf in conformity with the timetable announced 
by the Judge could result in a judicial determination, pursuant 
to § 3.29, that "the opportunity to file that application . . . 
shall be deemed waived."  Mr. Whitehill's brief on behalf of 
petitioner Green argues that Judge Fujimoto was obligated to 
"make clear the possible draconian consequences of failure to 
timely file."  Brief of Appellant [sic] at 13.  Because Judge 
Fujimoto gave no warning of the "possible draconian 
consequences," it is contended that Judge Fujimoto's ruling -- 
that Ms. Green's expected § 212(c) application had been abandoned 
and that, in consequence, Ms. Green was to be deported -- 
constituted a denial of due process, or, in the alternative, an 
abuse of discretion.  We now address these contentions. 
(A)  Due Process 
 In part I of this opinion, which presents the 
procedural history of this case, we have set forth the closing 
portion of Judge Fujimoto's August 18, 1993, telephone conference 
with Messrs. Sharkey and Whitehill.  For the purposes of this 
case, the crucial colloquy was the following: 
  Q.  You've already conceded 
deportability on the one charge, Mr. 
Whitehill, so as relief you're going to 
be requesting 212(c) waiver.  Correct? 
 
  A.  Sure are. 
 
  Q.  All right.  October 1st is the call-up date 
for that as well.  And, then we'll hold a hearing, 
assuming the application has been filed, on 
November 4th, 1993, 9:00 a.m., in Pittsburgh.  




 JUDGE TO BOTH COUNSEL 
 
  Q.  Is that acceptable, then, to both sides? 
 
 JUDGE TO MR. SHARKEY 
 
  Q. [sic]  Yes, sir. 
 
 JUDGE TO MR. WHITEHILL  
 
  A.  To the alien, it is acceptable. 
 
 At whatever time Mr. Whitehill first became acquainted 
with § 3.29, the INS regulation whose application he now 
challenges, he would have learned not only that Judge Fujimoto 
had formal authority to set an October 1, 1993, filing date for 
the § 212(c) application but also that failure to file on time 
would carry with it the probable consequence that "the 
opportunity to file that application . . . shall be deemed 
waived." 
 The record before this court is silent on when Mr. 
Whitehill first learned about § 3.29 -- on or prior to August 18, 
1993, when Judge Fujimoto set the schedule; or, perhaps, not 
before October 1, 1993, the date the § 212(c) application was to 
be filed; or, quite possibly, not before October 28, 1993, the 
day Judge Fujimoto filed his opinion; or, equally possibly, not 
before March 24, 1994, when the Board, in affirming Judge 
Fujimoto's decision, filed an opinion expressly relying on the 
challenged regulation.  We will assume, arguendo, that Mr. 
Whitehill was unaware of § 3.29 until after Judge Fujimoto's 
decision.  
  
 The burden of Mr. Whitehill's argument is that Judge 
Fujimoto was constitutionally foreclosed from applying § 3.29's 
waiver principle because he had not given Mr. Whitehill express 
warning that a failure to file on time could be the catalyst for 
a finding that the proposed § 212(c) application -- which on this 
record appears to have been the only potential mode of relief 
from deportation for a client whose deportability Mr. Whitehill 
had conceded on the record -- had been abandoned.5 
 We know of no authority for the notion that, as a 
general matter, the due process clause imposes on courts an 
obligation to advise lawyers personally of the potential adverse 
consequences of not complying with procedural rules.  To the 
contrary, we think that, as a general proposition, the American 
legal system presumes that lawyers who handle litigation have the 
responsibility of familiarizing themselves with procedural rules 
and the ways in which those rules are applied.  And we see no 
                     
5
.  The INS contends, inter alia, that in fact Judge Fujimoto 
"did explicitly put petitioner and her counsel on notice that the 
filing of her application for relief was a prerequisite to a 
further hearing in her case."  Brief for Respondent at 9-10.  
Presumably the INS has in mind Judge Fujimoto's recital at the 
August 18, 1993, telephone status conference that "October 1st is 
the call-up date for that [the § 212(c) application] as well.  
And, then we'll hold a hearing, assuming the application has been 
filed, on November 4th, 1993, 9:00 a.m., in Pittsburgh."  A.R. 
107.  The contention is not without some weight.  However, given 
our disposition of the case, we find it unnecessary to determine 
whether the Judge's recital adequately conveyed the thought that 
the filing of a § 212(c) application on time was a necessary 
predicate for a hearing at which Mr. Whitehill could present the 
case for avoidance of deportation. 
  
reason to suppose that this general proposition is without 
application to the particular sorts of procedural rules -- those 
that govern the timing of various phases of litigation -- at 
issue in this case.  We note that some of the rules that govern 
timing incorporate recitals, akin to that in § 3.29, as to the 
consequences of non-compliance, but that others do not.  An 
example of the former sort of rule is Rule 13 of the Rules of the 
Supreme Court:  Rule 13 provides that a petition for certiorari 
to review a judgment of a court of appeals, or of "a state court 
of last resort," or of the Court of Military Appeals, must be 
filed within ninety days of the entry of the judgment, and that 
one of the Justices may extend the time for no more than sixty 
days; and the rule further provides: "The Clerk will refuse to 
receive any petition for a writ of certiorari which is 
jurisdictionally out of time."  An example of the latter sort of 
rule is Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure: 
Rule 13(a), which governs appeals from the Tax Court, provides 
that "[r]eview . . . shall be obtained by filing a notice of 
appeal with the clerk of the Tax Court within 90 days after the 
decision of the Tax Court is entered," but the rule is silent as 
to the consequences of failing to file on time.  No case that has 
come to our attention gives ground for the inference that either 
of the quoted rules is, from the perspective of the Fifth 
Amendment, unenforceable in the absence of an express admonition 
  
by a clerk of court, or by a judge or by one of the Justices, 
that the rule means what it says. 
 It is contended, however, that § 3.29 is a special 
case.  Mr. Whitehill's brief points to a paragraph in a manual of 
guidance for immigration judges referred to as the "Immigration 
Judge's Benchbook" (Benchbook) -- a paragraph pursuant to which, 
so it is urged, Judge Fujimoto should have given Mr. Whitehill an 
express "admonishment" with respect to the consequences of a 
failure to conform to the filing date the Judge had announced.  
The paragraph in question is as follows:    
 Impress the importance of filing briefs and 
relief applications on a timely basis.  Those 
who fail to do so can be quickly cured of the 
practice if you summon them to court for an 
interim hearing, take pleadings and set up a 
filing schedule with an admonishment.  Such 
admonishment should state that if the 
application is not timely filed, you presume 
that it will not be forthcoming and you will 
enter a written decision cancelling the IC 
trial date and ordering deportation or 
voluntary departure, as appropriate.6 
  
 The INS contends that, since the Benchbook's first 
appearance in this case was in Mr. Whitehill's brief in this 
court, the Benchbook is not properly before us.7  The INS also 
contends that -- assuming the Benchbook can be considered by us 
                     
6
.  Benchbook (pre-1989 version), § III, ¶ B.2.f.(8).  Attachment 
B at III-17, to letter of Oct. 25, 1994, from Jane Gomez, Esq., 
Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, 
Department of Justice, to Ms. Pamela Lester, Deputy Clerk of this 
court. 
7
.  The INS argues that we should not consider the Benchbook for 
two, related, reasons: first, the Benchbook was not made part of 
  
-- Mr. Whitehill's reliance on the "admonishment" language is 
misplaced, for the reason that, although the language appeared in 
an early version of the Benchbook, it had been dropped from the 
version of the Benchbook which would have been consulted by 
immigration judges during the summer and fall of 1993 when Ms. 
Green's case was before Judge Fujimoto.8  We find it unnecessary 
to determine whether the Benchbook, in any of its versions, can 
properly be relied on here, because, even if the "admonishment" 
language was included in a version of the Benchbook which Judge 
Fujimoto might have had occasion to refer to in 1993, Mr. 
Whitehill's reliance on that language is unavailing.  The preface 
to the Benchbook -- a preface bearing the signature of Chief 
Immigration Judge William R. Robie -- recites that "[t]he 
procedures outlined herein (that are not contained within 
specific Operating Policies and Procedures memoranda) are not 
binding on the Immigration Judges, and are set forth solely as 
(..continued) 
the administrative record, and, second, the Benchbook was not 
relied upon by Mr. Whitehill before the Board.   
8
.  After Mr. Whitehill cited the Benchbook paragraph in his 
brief in this court, we requested counsel to submit pertinent 
portions of the Benchbook.  The INS submission shows the quoted 
paragraph to have been paragraph B.2.f. of a version of section 
III of the "Benchbook" that antedated 1989; the counterpart 
paragraph in the revised section III -- paragraph C.2.b.(6)(g) -- 
does not include the "admonishment" language.  The INS represents 
that the revised version was the one which was current in the 
summer and fall of 1993.  There was no further submission from 
Mr. Whitehill. 
  
practical suggestions for their consideration."9  Thus, even if 
the "admonishment" paragraph was part of the Benchbook guidance 
that Judge Fujimoto might have consulted in 1993, that guidance 
was not binding on Judge Fujimoto.  In short, the Benchbook had 
no regulatory weight.  A fortiori it had no constitutional 
weight. 
 In sum, we find that the arguments advanced by Mr. 
Whitehill fail to demonstrate that Ms. Green has been denied due 
process of law.   
 
(B)  Abuse of Discretion 
 For the reasons stated we have rejected the contention 
that the action of the Board, affirming the decision of Judge 
Fujimoto, constituted a denial to Ms. Green of due process of 
law.  It is contended, in the alternative, that the action of the 
Board constituted an abuse of discretion. 
                     
9
.  8 C.F.R. § 3.9 sets forth the principal duties of the Chief 
Immigration Judge: 
 
    The Chief Immigration Judge shall be 
responsible for the general supervision, 
direction and scheduling of the Immigration 
Judges in the conduct of the various programs 
assigned to them.  This shall include: 
 
    (a)  Establishment of operational 
policies; 
 
    (b)  Evaluation of the performance of 
Immigration Judge offices, making appropriate 
reports and inspections and taking corrective 
action where indicated. 
  
 The abuse-of-discretion claim covers the same ground as 
the due process claim, and we find it no more persuasive.  Judge 
Fujimoto did not act unreasonably in ruling, on October 28, 1993, 
that Mr. Whitehill's failure (a) to file a § 212(c) application 
due twenty-seven days before, or (b) to request an extension of 
time to file, worked an abandonment of the application.  Nor did 
the Board act unreasonably when, in reliance on § 3.29 and its 
own settled jurisprudence, it affirmed Judge Fujimoto's ruling.   
 III. 
 In his submissions to the Board, and subsequently to 
this court, Mr. Whitehill has not contended that his 
representation of Ms. Green before Judge Fujimoto was so 
inadequate as to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Cf. Lozada v. I.N.S., 857 F.2d 10, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1988).  Thus, 
that potential due process claim was not before the Board and is 
not before us.  It appears, however, that it is still open to Ms. 
Green to raise such a claim before the Board.  On oral argument 
here, in response to questions from the court, counsel for the 
INS said the following: 
 
 . . . Your Honor, she [Ms. Green] does have 
that right and there are administrative means 
to address that right. . . . 
 
 * * * * * * 
 
 . . . [W]hat the petitioner would need to do 
is file a motion to reopen with the Board 
asserting ineffective assistance.  She would 
also need to write down the agreement that 
was made with counsel and if any legal action 
  




If, after the issuance of our mandate denying the petition for 
review, Ms. Green does file with the Board a motion to reopen on 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel grounds, and if that motion is 
denied, we may then be called upon, on a subsequent petition for 
review, to determine whether the shortcomings of Ms. Green's 
counsel in handling the proceedings before Judge Fujimoto 
constituted a deprivation of due process. 
 
 Conclusion 
 Finding no error in the decision of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals, we deny the petition for review. 
